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DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF
TELEPHONE HEARINGS: THE CASE FOR AN





As the executive branch shrinks and reduces expenditures, its
adjudicative functions adjust to the new fiscal reality. Telephone
hearings are, therefore, increasingly being used in order to con-
trol costs. This Article examines the impact of telephone hearings
on the due process elements of unemployment compensation 'fair"
hearings. The Authors review the applicable federal and state law
and find that there is no absolute bar to using the telephone to
conduct administrative hearings. They test the empirical effect of
the telephone on hearings in California and Maine. Their analy-
sis of hundreds of hearings indicates that parties to telephone
hearings are less likely to exercise their rights to submit evidence
through witnesses and documents than are parties to in-person
hearings. The Authors caution that it is critical to balance the
interests of cost savings with the rights of the parties to the pro-
ceedings. Failure to do so may result in successful court challeng-
es to this practice.
WINDSWEPT
The wind whipped the blowing snow into a torrent of white
fog, engulfing the car that Sandy Kirk drove up and down the
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hills of northern Maine. It was just her luck, she thought, to
be assigned hearings 250 miles from home during the week
between Christmas and New Year's Day.
The tractor-trailers sailed by her on the two-lane highway.
They transformed fluffy snow on the road into black ice. She
needed to concentrate if she wanted to make it home.
She thought back to how she had handled the last hearing
of that day. John Shields, a claimant, had called three hours
before his hearing to find out whether it would be cancelled.
He told her that he lived ten miles from the hearing site and
did not think it was safe to drive. The wind chill factor was
fifty to seventy degrees below zero and he did not want to be
stranded on an unplowed road. He told her that the state
police were advising against any "unnecessary" driving.
Sandy offered to take Mr. Shields's testimony by phone. He
asked her whether she would consider the twenty-five pages
of documents proving that he did not embezzle money from
the convenience store that he had managed. Sandy told him
that she would not be able to consider them unless she could
review them at the hearing. What she did not say is that she
did not want to make a finding that he did or did not embez-
zle over $1000 from the cash register based solely on tele-
phone testimony.
The time came for the hearing. When Sandy called for the
parties in the lobby, Mr. Shields and an agent for the employer
stood up. After Sandy started the hearing, the agent explained
that his client, Greg Irons, the vice president of the company,
was waiting to be telephoned in Florida, where he was on
vacation.
Sandy tried not to show any emotion, but she felt terrible.
She had made Mr. Shields drive in this dangerous weather in
order to plead his case in person, while Mr. Irons could pick up
a telephone in his Florida hotel room. What should she do? The
case was not scheduled as a telephone hearing. Mr. Shields had
brought his twenty-five pages of documents, which the vice
president would not be able to question.
But now, after the hearing, Sandy turned her thoughts
again to the road and the weather. She had no time to dwell
on the hearing; she had to get home safely.
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INTRODUCTION
The challenge in deciding whether to conduct a hearing by
telephone lies in ensuring that individual rights are not
compromised. Economic factors will influence the decision, but
the decision should be individualized, with the due process
rights of the parties as the primary concern.
Sandy's story presents common dilemmas for hearing offi-
cers and their managers who schedule telephone hearings:
* Is it appropriate to take telephone testimony from one side
for that party's convenience?
" How can documents be admitted if they have not been
distributed to the parties before the hearing?
* How much weight should poor weather conditions be given
when it makes a telephone hearing more convenient for
the hearing staff?
* Are telephone hearings more advantageous to one party
because witnesses or documents are less likely to be avail-
able in telephone hearings?
" Should the seriousness of the allegations, i.e. felony crime,
weigh in favor of an in-person hearing?
This Article attempts to provide a framework to answer
these and other questions regarding telephone hearings. It ex-
amines the due process implications of conducting unemploy-
ment compensation hearings in whole or in part by telephone.
Part I presents a framework for a due process analysis of
hearings by telephone and examines the relevant federal case
law pertaining to the use of teleconferencing in administrative
hearings. Part II includes an analysis of state cases that have
considered challenges to telephone hearings. Parts III, IV, V,
and VI of the Article present the results of a statistical survey
conducted in Maine and California for the purpose of com-
paring. in-person hearings with telephone hearings. The statis-
tical survey measured such factors as the nonappearance rate
for parties, the rates of representation, the numbers of
Telephone Hearings
410 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
witnesses testifying, the extent of documentary evidence
production, the rates of reversal for both claimants and em-
ployers, and the rates of appeal to the higher authority. The
Article concludes with recommendations for the use of tele-
phone hearings in unemployment compensation appeals.
Background
Unemployment compensation hearings are conducted by
telephone for a variety of reasons. In many instances, the
claimant has moved away from the area in which he was
employed and files a claim for benefits in the new location. In
such a situation, the hearing will be conducted in the location
where the claim was filed, with the claimant appearing in
person and the employer participating by telephone. When the
claimant has moved out of state, both parties will appear by
telephone.
Frequently, parties scheduled to appear at a hearing in
person will, upon receiving the hearing notice, request to
appear by telephone. In other situations, a party will appear
in person but request that a witness be allowed to testify by
telephone. When these requests are received in advance of the
hearing, the hearing officer can determine whether such an
appearance would be appropriate and rule accordingly. When
a party initially makes the request at the time of the hearing,
however, the decision is not that simple, as Sandy's case illus-
trates.
Originally, teleconferencing began as an outgrowth of "split
hearings," that is, situations where a hearing was held for the
claimant in one location and a separate hearing was held for
the employer in a different location. The use of telecon-
ferencing made it possible for the opposing parties in each
location to question each other, rather than to rely on the
presence of a referee at each hearing.' California pioneered
this procedure, and it received judicial approval with Slattery
v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.2 In
Slattery, the claimant was discharged from her employment in
1. See Slattery v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. Rptr.
422, 424 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
2. 131 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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Los Angeles and subsequently relocated to Eureka, California.
She was awarded unemployment insurance benefits, and the
employer appealed. In accordance with then-existing Appeals
Board regulations, simultaneous hearings were scheduled for
the claimant in Eureka and for the employer in Los Angeles.
The claimant was the only witness at the hearing in Eureka.
Two witnesses testified for the employer in Los Angeles.
Pursuant to the Appeals Board's usual practice, the referee
who conducted the Los Angeles hearing made the decision.
That referee reversed the Department's determination and
ruled in favor of the employer. The Appeals Board affirmed
the decision.3
Before the court of appeals, the claimant contended that the
Appeals Board failed to inform her of authorized procedures,
such as telephone hearings, that would have permitted her to
examine opposing witnesses and rebut unfavorable evidence
at the Los Angeles hearing.4 The court noted that the governing
statute authorized the Appeals Board to adopt rules governing
claims and appeals.5 Pursuant to this statute, the Appeals
Board had adopted regulations regarding the conduct of hear-
ings.? The California Code of Regulations contains a general
due process regulation providing that parties have the right to
confront hostile witnesses and to rebut opposing evidence.7 The
Appeals Board did not sufficiently inform the claimant in
Slattery that these were her rights.8 The regulations, as written
at the time Slattery was decided, also provided that, in situa-
tions where it was impractical for parties to appear at the same
place for a hearing, a hearing for each party would be scheduled
3. Id. at 423.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 424; see also CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 411, 1951 (West 1986).
6. Slattery, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
7. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 5038(b) (1995), provides in part as follows:
Each party shall have these rights: to call and examine parties and witnesses;
to introduce exhibits; to question opposing witnesses and parties on any matter
relevant to the issues even though that matter was not covered in the direct
examination; to impeach any witness regardless of which party first called the
witness to testify; and to rebut the evidence against him or her.
Id.
8. Slattery, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
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as nearly simultaneously as possible.9 The Appeals Board did
not follow this regulation, and the claimant was unaware of
this procedure.'
In reversing the Appeals Board, the court of appeals noted
that the claimant did not receive the adversarial hearing that
the Board's own rules and practices authorized and to which
the claimant was entitled." In dicta, the court commented
favorably upon conferenced telephone hearings and noted that
such hearings were "an imaginative attempt to solve the due
process problems which inhere in the simultaneous hearing
concept." 2 The court further noted: "The Board has devised a
pragmatic solution, made possible by modern technology, which
attempts to reconcile the problem of geographically separated
adversaries with the core elements of a fair adversary hearing:
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to
rebut or explain unfavorable evidence."13
Before the use of telephone hearings became common, split
hearings were often employed in interstate claims. 4 Interstate
claims arise when a claimant who has worked for an in-state
employer moves out of state and then claims unemployment
compensation benefits based on benefit credits that accrued in
the first state. 5 A hearing officer from the "agent state" (the
9. Id. at 424. The court quoted then-existing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 5041:
Where "because of the distance involved.... it is impracticable for parties...
to appear at the same place of hearing, a hearing for each party will be scheduled
... as nearly simultaneously as possible." If simultaneous hearings are sched-
uled, "parties may submit questions to the referee to be asked of the opposing
party,... in writing.., prior to the hearing."
Id. (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 425.
11. Id. at 423-24.
12. Id. at 424.
13. Id. at 425.
14. Jerome R. Corsi & Thomas L. Hurley, Attitudes Toward the Use of the Tele-
phone in Administrative Fair Hearings: The California Experience, 31 ADMIN. L. REV.
247, 249 (1979). Corsi and Hurley argue that the telephone was a development of
modern technology that unemployment insurance appeals tribunals underutilized in
the face of less desirable alternatives such as the split hearing procedure. Id. at 248.
The article incorporated a survey of California administrative law judges who were
found to be, in general, favorably inclined toward the use of the telephone in
appropriate situations. Id. at 270.
15. See Mark D. Esterle, Interstate Claims: Their History and Their Challenges,
29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 485, 485 (1996). Claimants who are absent from the states in
which their benefit credits have accrued typically may apply for benefits, have their
eligibility for benefits determined, participate in appeals hearings, and receive benefit
payments. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 455-1 to 455-9 (1995).
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state to which the claimant has moved) would conduct the
claimant's hearing, and a hearing officer from the "liable state"
(the state from which the claimant had moved) would conduct
a separate hearing with the employer.1 6 A transcript or tape
of each of the hearings would then be sent to the other party
for comment or rebuttal before the case would be submitted for
decision to the liable state's hearing officer.' 7 The disadvantages
of such systems were apparent and numerous.'" Frequently, the
agent state's hearing officer was not sufficiently familiar with
the liable state's statutes, regulations, precedents, and case
law.' 9 Thus, much superfluous information might be obtained
or a relevant matter not developed. 20 The system allowed for
only an indirect opportunity to examine opposing witnesses-a
party never confronted the other directly, but could only
comment on or rebut testimony based on a review of the tape
or transcript. Neither side had the advantage of knowing the
testimony of the other side prior to giving testimony. No single
hearing officer heard all of the testimony or had the opportu-
nity to question both sides. 2' Additionally, in interstate hear-
ings, the hearing officer who heard the employer's in-person
testimony generally also rendered the decision, a situation seen
as favoring the employer.22 In fact, as the Slattery court noted,
the hearing officer from the liable state decided cases of this
type on the basis of what was, in effect, a pretrial deposition
from the claimant and a "live" evidentiary hearing at which
only the employer's unimpeached and uncontradicted witnesses
would testify.23
Current Developments
Telephone hearings are superior in many ways to the split
hearing procedure of years past.24 Both parties to a telephone
16. Corsi & Hurley, supra note 14, at 249.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 250-51.
19. Id. at 251.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 252.
23. Slattery v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. Rptr. 422,
425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Corsi & Hurley, supra note 14, at 252. Other articles on the subject
of telephone hearings include Jerome R. Corsi et al., Major Findings of the New Mexico
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hearing can be heard by a single hearing officer and can
confront, rebut, or impeach unfavorable evidence. Telephone
hearings allow for a generally effective right of confrontation,
because each party is present before the hearing officer when
the other party presents its case.25
The telephone hearing procedure is now used to some extent
in all unemployment insurance jurisdictions. In most states,
approximately twenty percent of hearings proceed with at least
one party appearing by telephone. In some states, including
Michigan, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, the
percentage is lower. In New York, for example, less than fifteen
percent of hearings involve the use of a telephone, including
the testimony of non-party witnesses. In other states, however,
the percentage is significantly higher. These states include the
large, sparsely populated states of Alaska, Idaho, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota. They also
include smaller states such as Iowa and Vermont.26
Many factors may be considered in determining whether to
schedule a hearing by telephone or in person. As noted earlier,
telephone hearings are clearly preferred in situations in which
the parties are located in different communities.2" The trend
among the states today is toward increasing the use of tele-
phone hearings, without regard to geographic factors.28 States
generally cite economic reasons to explain this trend; indeed,
telephone hearings present some economic advantages over in-
person hearings. For example, such hearings enhance available
calendar time and hearing officer productivity because they
require less travel. Furthermore, hearings can be conducted out
of a centralized office, thus eliminating the need to lease out-
station hearing facilities. In an all-telephone environment, even
hearing rooms can be eliminated, because hearings can be
conducted from the hearing officer's desk.
Experiment of Teleconferenced Administrative Fair Hearings, 38 U MIAMI L. REV. 647
(1984); Jerome R. Corsi & Thomas L. Hurley, Pilot Study Report on the Use of the
Telephone in Administrative Fair Hearings, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 485 (1979).
25. Corsi & Hurley, supra note 14, at 252.
26. Telephone Interview with Jack Bright, Appeals Specialist, Unemployment
Insurance Service, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor (Feb. 5, 1996).
27. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
28. In 1994, for example, Oregon and Texas began hearing over 90% of their
appeals by telephone. See Telephone Interview with Jack Bright, supra note 26.
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Telephone hearings entail costs of their own, however. There
is, of course, the expense of the call itself, and lengthy, multi-
party conference calls are costly. If the available telephone
equipment does not have conferencing capability, operator
assistance must be obtained, which adds to the expense. In
addition, telephone hearings may result in a higher percentage
of appeals to the higher authority.29 This factor alone can offset
any savings. Because the parties will not be physically present,
the file must be duplicated and mailed to them in advance of
the hearing, thereby increasing staffing and postage expenses.
Costs for duplicating and telecommunications equipment are
significant. Finally, telephone hearings may generate higher-
authority remands because of faulty recordings.
Costs aside, the question is raised as to what, if anything,
is sacrificed in a telephone hearing, as opposed to in-person
hearings. For example, many nonverbal cues inherent in an in-
person hearing can play no role in hearings conducted via
telephone. These cues can provide information as to the rela-
tionship between the parties; for example, they can signify
either cooperation and mutual respect or hostility and mistrust.
The manner in which a witness presents herself can influence
how the hearing officer will formulate questions and evaluate
responses. In other words, the general physical appearance of
a party or witness, together with the regard that she shows
others present at the hearing, naturally allows the hearing
officer to tailor the hearing and enables communication on a
multidimensional level. None of this information is available
in a telephone hearing. In fact, a hearing officer might consider
a tone of voice to be angry, hostile, or uncertain, but might have
perceived it very differently had the hearing officer seen the
witness.
These factors can and do affect the quality of the evidence
produced in the course of a hearing. Because the hearing officer
does not receive the information provided by nonverbal cues,
she may miss opportunities to develop communication with the
parties. Ultimately, loss of these cues can diminish the eviden-
tiary base upon which the hearing officer exercises her judg-
ment.
Apparently, however, the telephone format does not adversely
affect the hearing officer's ability to evaluate witness credi-
bility. The opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor
29. See discussion infra Part VI.
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of a witness while testifying has long been considered almost
sacrosanct in evaluating witness credibility.3 ° In recent years,
however, several commentators have taken exception to this
principle. Basing their opinions on studies by psychologists and
other social scientists, they have concluded that demeanor
based on visual observation is, in and of itself, generally not
useful in determining witness credibility."' In fact, one commen-
tator has concluded that all demeanor evidence, including audi-
tory cues, is essentially worthless.32 Moreover, no court has
stated flatly that a hearing can be fair only if it is face-to-face.
The majority of courts addressing the issue tends to find that
observation of demeanor is not essential to a fair hearing
because the fact finder has other tools available for determining
credibility.33 Indeed, the intrinsic value of the testimony itself
rather than the manner in which the witness delivers it
remains a far better ground upon which to base credibility
determinations. In short, as stated above, the loss of nonverbal
cues can ultimately diminish the evidentiary base of a given
hearing. We believe, however, that the absence of visual
demeanor evidence, in and of itself, does not significantly
impact a hearing officer's ability to make accurate determina-
tions.
Telephone hearings diminish the evidentiary base in other
areas as well. For example, although telephone hearings
generally protect a party's right of confrontation, they may
hinder them instead. Available evidence indicates that a party's
right to representation, to submission of documentary evidence,
and to subpoena and call witnesses might be compromised in
the telephone hearing procedure.3 4 In determining whether tele-
phone hearings could go so far as to violate a claimant's due
process rights, this Article first presents issues of due process
in unemployment compensation hearings.
30. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) (noting that the right
to a face-to-face confrontation "ensur[es] the integrity of the fact-finding process");
NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting that demeanor
evidence can serve as an "excellent clue to the trustworthiness of testimony").
31. E.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The
Validity of Demeanor Evidence inAssessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157,
1200 (1993); Margaret A. Lareau & Howard R. Sacks, Assessing Credibility in Labor
Arbitration, 5 LAB. LAW. 151,175 (1989); Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining
Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 245 (1988); Olin G.
Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1104 (1991).
32. Wellborn, supra note 31, at 1091. But see Blumenthal, supra note 31, at 1203
n.288 (criticizing this conclusion as too extreme).
33. See discussion infra Part II.B.
34. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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I. FRAMEWORK FOR DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
OF TELEPHONE HEARINGS
A. The Process Due to Parties
A claimant must have an opportunity for a "fair hearing" if
a state denies her unemployment compensation benefits.35 In
other words, before a claimant may be deprived of her property,
due process requires that she receive "notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."3" The United
States Supreme Court has not addressed specifically whether
the use of telephone conference hearings may constitute a fair
hearing before deprivation of the right to unemployment
benefits. The Court, however, has measured many other admin-
istrative procedures against the constitutional standard.37
The challenge in applying due process is its inherent vari-
ability. The Court has stated:
For all its consequence, "due process" has never been, and
perhaps can never be, precisely defined. "[U]nlike some
legal rules," this Court has said, due process "is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances." Rather, the phrase expresses the
requirement of "fundamental fairness," a requirement
whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.
Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain
enterprise which must discover what "fundamental fairness"
consists of in a particular situation by first considering any
relevant precedents and then by assessing the several inter-
ests that are at stake.38
35. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1994). There is no corresponding federal statutory right
for an employer whose unemployment insurance tax is increased because a claimant
receives benefits.
36. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
37. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that documen-
tary review of social security disability filed prior to termination satisfies the due
process requirement); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (holding that
written medical reports may be received in evidence in social security disability
termination hearings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (holding that
written correspondence and personal conference with a caseworker prior to termination
of welfare benefits is not constitutionally deficient notice).
38. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) (citations
omitted).
Telephone Hearings
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The Social Security Act specifically provides for fair hearings:
The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for
payment to any State unless he finds that the law of such
State ... includes provision for ... [sluch methods of
administration... as are found by the Secretary of Labor
to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of un-
employment compensation when due; and... [oipportunity
for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all
individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation
are denied .. .
In 197 1, the Supreme Court considered whether the statutory
protections of the Social Security Act sufficiently served for due
process purposes. In California Department of Human Resour-
ces Development v. Java,4 ° the plaintiffs argued that California
denied them due process of law by cutting off benefits when a
former employer appealed an initial grant of benefit payments
to claimants.4 ' The Court found it unnecessary to reach the
question of whether a delay in payment to claimants constitutes
a denial of due process.42 Nevertheless, it identified the interest
of those who rely upon unemployment benefits:
A kind of "need" is present in the statutory scheme for
insurance, however, to the extent that any "salary re-
placement" insurance fulfills a need caused by lost em-
ployment. The objective of Congress was to provide a
substitute for wages lost during a period of unemployment
not the fault of the employee. Probably no program could
be devised to make insurance payments available precisely
on the nearest payday following the termination, but to the
extent that this was administratively feasible this must be
regarded as what Congress was trying to accomplish. The
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute
confirm this.43
39. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1994).
40. 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
41. Id. at 123.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 130. This interest is one of the three considerations that must be
weighed in determining whether a procedure passes constitutional muster under the
due process standard of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See infra notes
53-59 and accompanying text.
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The Court concluded that the Social Security Act mandates that
there be no unreasonable delay in the payment of unemploy-
ment benefits." Motivated by Java, the United States Depart-
ment of Labor established a single procedural standard: that
all appeals affecting benefit rights are "heard and decided with
the greatest promptness that is administratively feasible."45 A
legitimate question is whether a singular concern for the speed
of disposition has adversely affected other procedural pro-
tections. Using telephone hearings certainly accelerates disposi-
tions, but does it satisfy other due process protections?
A year earlier, in Goldberg v. Kelly,46 the Supreme Court had
addressed the issue of what process is due to welfare recipients
who face termination of benefits. The Court first identified the
interest of the welfare recipient in the government decision to
terminate benefits:" '[A] welfare recipient is destitute, without
funds or assets .... Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare
recipient in the face of... "brutal need" without a prior
hearing of some sort is unconscionable .... ' , The Court
stated that "[tihe extent to which procedural due process must
be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which
he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' ,,48 The Court
went on to establish the minimum procedural safeguards which
must be met prior to terminating the ability to obtain these
necessities, including the following:
9 the right to timely and adequate notice of the basis for
termination;
The Court reaffirmed this protection from loss of unemployment benefits in Fusari
v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975). Although the Fusari Court found it unnecessary
to rule on whether Connecticut's practice of seated interviews to determine continued
eligibility violated the unemployment compensation claimant's due process rights
because the procedures had been changed while the case was pending, the Court
nevertheless noted the due process implications of the case:
Identification of the precise dictates of due process requires consideration of both
the governmental function involved and the private interests affected by official
action .... In this context, the possible length of wrongful deprivation of
unemployment benefits is an important factor in assessing the impact of official
action on the private interests.
Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
44. See Java, 402 US. at 133.
45. 20 C.F.R. § 650.1(a) (1995).
46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
47. Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
48. Id. at 262-63.
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" the opportunity to defend against the reason for termi-
nation;
• the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses;
" the opportunity to present arguments and evidence orally;
" the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses;
" the opportunity for representation by counsel;
" the right to a reasoned decision stating the evidence upon
which it relied; and
" the right to an impartial decision maker.49
In Goldberg, the Court stated the minimum requirements
that must be met before a person's welfare benefits could be
terminated, essentially establishing the requirements of a full
adversarial hearing. A few years later, in Mathews v.
Eldridge,5" the Court was faced with the similar circumstances
of a social security disability recipient whose benefits had been
terminated.5 Pursuant to the disability benefits scheme, the
recipient's medical information was reviewed, and his benefits
were terminated based on it. The recipient received a copy of
this information and was given an opportunity to respond to
it in writing.52 The Court responded very differently to this
situation, however.
Rather than adopt the Goldberg minimum standards for this
type of proceeding, the Mathews Court adopted a three-part
balancing approach. The first part of the test considers the
private interest that will be affected. The Court did not find the
same "brutal need" as in Goldberg because the disability
recipients have the "option" of applying for benefits through
other social welfare programs.53 The second part of the test
49. Id. at 267-71.
50. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
51. Id. at 323.
52. Id. at 335-38.
53. Id. at 340-43. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, criticized this distinction,
maintaining that it was difficult to distinguish recipients who are totally dependent
on social security benefits for food, housing, and medical care, from those receiving
welfare benefits. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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analyzes the risks of erroneous deprivation of the private
interest identified in the first part, through the procedures used
and the value of additional safeguards. 4 The final part of the
test focuses on the cost to the agency in time, resources, and
money for additional procedural protection. 5 This final consid-
eration takes into account the costs of additional procedures
and of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending
decision.5" The Court recognized that terminated recipients
have a right to a fair hearing before an administrative law
judge.57 It considered the percentage of reversals and the likeli-
hood of recovery of benefits: "At some point the benefit of an
additional safeguard to the individual affected by the adminis-
trative action and to society in terms of increased assurance
that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.""
The Mathews test presents a flexible approach, in keeping
with traditional concepts of due process. It strikes a compro-
mise between competing interests of accuracy and efficiency,
a compromise that is at least fundamentally fair to the indi-
vidual. The test establishes the minimum level of protection
to which the individual is entitled when the state exercises
power over the individual's rights of life, liberty, and property."
B. Application of the Mathews Three-Part Test
As a procedure for resolving a disputed claim, the telephone
hearing is simply another technique that must pass the
Mathews three-part test. No federal appellate court has ad-
dressed the constitutionality of telephone hearings. In two
recent United States court of appeals cases, however, the courts
54. Id. at 343-47.
55. Id. at 347-48.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 349.
58. Id. at 348.
59. Courts must apply the Mathews analysis to determine whether a procedure
for withdrawal of public benefits meets due process standards. Id. at 335. However,
the states have nearly uniformly dispensed with distinctions among programs by
enacting legislation that incorporates the Goldberg standards of formal adjudication.
See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 4-201 to 4-221, 15 U.L.A. 7,74-98 (1981);
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 9, 15 U.L.A. 137, 207-08 (1961). More than
half of the states have an administrative procedure act based on either the 1961 or
1981 Model Acts. Preface to MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1981), 15 U.L.A.
1 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
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used the flexible analysis of Mathews to determine that certain
state unemployment compensation hearing procedures did not
meet due process standards.6 0 In so doing, the courts favored
the claimants' rights over claims of convenience of cost and
administration.
First, in Shaw v. Valdez,6 the plaintiffs challenged the
adequacy of the notice of the issues to be considered at their
hearings. Colorado had provided only a boilerplate notice listing
all possible issues and argued that administrative burdens
precluded more detailed notice.62 The court responded:
[W]e are not persuaded by the consideration that the
volume of appeals in such cases required expeditious pro-
ceedings, without a more specific notice. The State could
afford a fair hearing premised on fair notice by a brief
statement of particular factual and legal points to be raised
at the hearing, and here the protest letter itself could have
been furnished with a warning to the parties that there
would be no "issue switching" at the hearing.63
Colorado's arguments that the procedure was entrenched and
saved money were not enough to justify its procedural devices.64
Instead, courts evaluate a state's administrative convenience
arguments on an objective basis: What are the costs of addition-
al notice procedures that would assist the parties' understand-
ing of the issues? Are there different means of providing notice
to the party?
6 5
In the second case, Cuellar v. Texas Employment Commis-
sion,66 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a
constitutional due process claim. Here, the state refused to
grant a continuance so that the plaintiff could subpoena a
reasonably unanticipated witness, upon whose affidavit the
referee relied in disqualifying plaintiff from receiving benefits.6
Cuellar presented the issue as to "whether and under what
60. Cueller v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 825 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1987); Shaw
v. Valdez, 819 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1987).
61. 819 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1987).
62. Id. at 969-70.
63. Id. at 970.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. 825 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 939.
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circumstances cross-examination of adverse affiants is required
at a disqualification hearing, once provided by the State, before
an unemployment benefit referee."8 The district court found
that the state's refusal to provide a subpoena was reasonable,
basing its decision, in part, on "the government's interest in
hearing all available evidence at the time set for the hearing."69
The court of appeals ordered the district court to determine
the "precise magnitude of the interests involved to the extent
necessary to resolve the issues presented in this case. The
district court may be required to determine [under what
circumstances] a claimant possesses a general confrontation
right" if she ever does.7°
Mathews, Shaw, and Cuellar demonstrate that administrative
convenience, efficiency, and cost savings are not complete
defenses to due process claims against telephone hearings or
other procedures that limit the basic hearing rights enumerated
in Goldberg. Federal courts will keep an open mind when
approaching challenges to state hearing procedures.
II. ANALYSIS OF STATE CHALLENGES TO
TELEPHONE HEARINGS
As noted in the Introduction, taking testimony by telephone
represents a relatively new development in the judicial and
quasi-judicial systems.7' Although claimants have challenged
the practice on constitutional due process grounds, state courts
generally have either supported the use of telephone hearings
when they are conducted with sufficient procedural safeguards,
or have bypassed the due process issues by denying the appeal
on other grounds.
In general, courts that have considered these issues have
made narrow fact-specific holdings, often on grounds other than
due process. Courts have not specifically addressed all of the
fair hearing requirements. An analysis of various state courts'
responses to a variety of those issues follows.
68. Id. at 936.
69. Id. at 934.
70. Id. at 939.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 24-34.
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A. Waiver by Absence of Timely Objection:
Focus on Pennsylvania
Courts commonly evade due process analysis by finding that
the issues raised on appeal are not properly before them.
Consistent with appellate procedure in general, a number of
courts hold that failure to object to the telephonic hearing at
the administrative level results in waiver of that issue on
appeal. In other cases, the absence of objection appears irrele-
vant where the court finds that issues of fundamental fairness
are at stake.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has had extensive
exposure to issues raised by telephone hearings.72 The reason-
ing of the commonwealth court, however, produces inconsistent
results and appears to depend, at least somewhat, upon results-
oriented analysis.
In Chobert v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 3 the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
clearly set forth their standards for telephone hearings:
We do not condemn the practice of conducting adminis-
trative hearings or the examination of witnesses by tele-
phone conference call; but such hearings and examinations
must comport with fundamental fairness guaranteed by the
due process clause, with the statutory requirement of a fair
hearing in unemployment compensation hearings, and with
the board's regulations to the same effect .. .
In Chobert, both parties appeared in person at the referee's
hearing and neither party was represented by counsel. 75 During
the hearing, the referee telephoned one of the employer's
witnesses to inquire about the claimant's work habits, without
informing the claimant in advance that this witness would be
contacted. The telephone witness offered other reasons for the
claimant's discharge, testifying, in part, from documents that
72. Research disclosed relatively few reported state cases on the due process
implications of telephone hearings. Of the thirty-six reported cases, twelve emerged
from the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
73. 484 A.2d 223 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
74. Id. at 225 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 224.
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were not available to the claimant. The claimant denied the
allegations of the telephone witness.76 The referee found that
the claimant was discharged for the reasons asserted by the
telephone witness and denied benefits.77 The Board adopted the
referee's findings and affirmed the referee's decision.78
The case does not indicate whether the claimant objected to
the telephone testimony below. Regardless, the commonwealth
court found that
[clearly, it was unfair to the uncounseled claimant and
contrary to law to permit the company president to testify
by telephone from records not available to the claimant to
use in cross-examination .... The right of due process in-
cludes the opportunity of a party to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. In this case, the examination
having been by telephone, no one at the hearing could know
whether the document the company president referred to
was used by him to refresh his memory or to introduce as
past recollection recorded. If it was for refreshment, the
claimant was entitled to have it to refer to in cross-
examin[ation]; if it was past recollection recorded, it must
have been proved to be accurate and offered into evidence.79
A few months later, in German v. Commonwealth Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review, s° the commonwealth
court again considered an unemployment compensation case
that had been decided based upon the testimony of one tele-
phone witness who referred to a document that was not part
of the record of the hearing. Unlike Chobert, however, German
was marred by a procedural error. In German, the claimant
appealed a decision and order of the Board of Review affirming
a referee's denial of benefits. 8' The claimant was represented
by a paralegal. A private investigator testified by telephone
without prior notice to the claimant, and referred to his written
reports, which were not entered into evidence. On appeal, the
claimant argued that the credibility of the witness appearing
by telephone could not be assessed and that the witness's
76. Id. at 224-25.
77. Id. at 225.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. 489 A.2d 308 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1985).
81. Id. at 309.
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testimony given with the aid of a written report unavailable
to the claimant should be treated as hearsay. The paralegal
representing the claimant at the hearing had not objected to
either the telephonic nature of the testimony or the use of
reports that were not part of the record.82
The court affirmed the decision of the Board, stating only that
the claimant's representative was given the opportunity to
object to both the telephone hearing and the use of the reports,
and her failure to do so resulted in waiver of the issues.83 The
court therefore found that there was substantial evidence to
support the Board's decision. 4
German can be distinguished from Chobert in a number of
respects. In Chobert, the claimant was unrepresented, while
in German the claimant was represented by a paralegal. 85 In
Chobert, the witness apparently did not have direct knowledge
of the events to which he was testifying and relied on docu-
ments that were not offered as evidence. 86 In contrast, the
witness in German was an actual witness to the events about
which he testified.87 Although the witness in German may have
referred to a report he prepared based upon his observation,
the witness had personal knowledge of the events described.88
These factual distinctions make the court's apparently contra-
dictory actions appear as reasonable decisions based upon the
particular circumstances of the cases.
Interestingly, although the court in German held that the
claimant waived any objection to the telephone hearing process,
it also noted that it could not locate any authority enabling the
Board to conduct hearings by telephone. 89 The court thus set
the stage for its next round of cases dealing with telephone
hearings.
Less than a year after deciding German, in Knisley v. Com-
monwealth Unemployment Compensation Board ofReview, 90 the
commonwealth court vacated and remanded a decision reached




85. Compare Chobert, 484 A.2d at 224 with German, 489 A.2d at 309.
86. See Chobert, 484 A.2d at 224.
87. See German, 489 A.2d at 309.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 309 n.3.
90. 501 A.2d 1180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
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of hearing, and the court found that there were no properly
promulgated regulations on telephone hearings to "safeguard
the minimum due process rights of the parties and also insure
that the hearings are conducted uniformly by the referees."9 '
The claimant's hearing before a referee had included taking
testimony of a key witness for the employer by telephone.92
The Knisley court expressed concern about potential areas
of abuse "inherent in telephonic hearings."93 Among the court's
concerns was the possibility of witnesses fraudulently misrepre-
senting their identities at such proceedings and witnesses re-
ferring to records that had not been admitted to the hearing
record or disclosed to the opposing party.94 Nothing in the
decision of this case suggested that any of the court's concerns
had, in fact, been realized previously.95 Nonetheless, the court
mandated the implementation of safeguards that would insure
that the hearings would comport with the fundamental fairness
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.96 It further ordered that
until such time as the regulations were adopted, "evidence
obtained via telephone, if properly objected to, will be stricken
from the record."97
Following Knisley, at least two other Pennsylvania cases were
summarily resolved based upon the Board of Review's failure
to promulgate regulations concerning telephone hearings, coupl-
ed with a timely objection to telephone testimony.98 In Sherman
v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review,99 the claimant appealed a decision of the Office of
Employment Security. At the referee's hearing the employer
testified by telephone. The claimant's attorney timely objected
to the taking of testimony by telephone, but to no avail. The
referee affirmed the decision of the Office of Employment
Security, and the claimant appealed to the Board of Review.
The Board remanded the matter to give the employer an
opportunity to present in-person testimony, but the employer







98. E.g., Sherman v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
539 A.2d 23, 25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Weston v. Commonwealth Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 520 A.2d 953, 954 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
99. 539 A.2d 23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
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was unavailable for the remanded hearing and requested a
continuance. The referee decided the case without evidence
from the employer, but because the employer requested a con-
tinuance, the Board again remanded the matter to the referee
for a second hearing.100
At the second remanded hearing, the employer's represen-
tative testified that he had been provided a copy of the tran-
script of the original telephonic hearing and that he had no
additional testimony. The employer presented no further
evidence. The claimant renewed his objection to the use of any
testimony elicited during the telephonic hearing as violative
of Knisley, but the Board ultimately issued a decision denying
benefits. The claimant appealed on the grounds that the
decision denying him benefits was based largely upon tele-
phonic hearing evidence to which he had objected.'
The Sherman court agreed with the claimant, stating that
Knisley compelled the decision that testimony provided at the
original telephone hearing could not be reaffirmed by the
employer's witnesses, because it was not properly on the
record.'0 2 Without testimony from the witness who appeared
by telephone, the court found that there was no evidence to
prove the claimant's misconduct and therefore reversed the
decision of the Board.
0 3
Nowhere in its decision did the court indicate what, if any-
thing, was objectionable about the telephone testimony. The
mere fact of its existence, combined with the claimant's timely
objection to it, rendered the testimony improper.' 4 The claim-
ant made no suggestion that the testimony was adduced by a
fraudulent witness, or that the witness was coached or im-
properly referred to documents not on the record. Nothing in
the decision suggests that counsel did not have a full opportu-
nity to examine or cross-examine witnesses or that there was
any concern regarding any witness testifying by telephone
who referenced documents not part of the record.
In light of Knisley, the only reason for the court's decision
was to sanction the agency for failing to promulgate regula-
tions, regardless of whether the actual telephone hearing in
this case presented any genuine due process issues. In fact, the
100. Id. at 24.
101. Id. at 24-25.




court scoffed at the suggestion that the absence of substantive
concerns should cause it to change its decision.1" 5 It stated:
Whether strategic or substantive, the claimant's continuing
objection to the submission of evidence adduced at the
telephonic hearing was correct. It was the employer's duty
to present testimony at the first or second remand hearing
that would carry the burden of proving willful misconduct
on the part of the claimant. The employer did not do so, but
instead relied upon the testimony which was given at the
telephonic hearing.' 6
In Weston v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,' °7 the claimant appealed an order of the Board
of Review, which affirmed, without taking further testimony,
the referee's denial of unemployment benefits. The referee had
based his decision on a finding of willful misconduct on the part
of the claimant. The claimant appealed because, among other
things, the hearing before the referee was a telephone hearing
to which the claimant properly objected. The claimant argued
that, under Knisley, the evidence obtained over his objection
at the telephone hearing may not be used to support the
referee's order. The court did not reveal what other substantive
matters were raised on appeal, but only noted that the claimant
had other arguments.'
The commonwealth court again summarily vacated the
Board's decision based upon the timely objection to the tele-
phone hearing, without addressing the claimant's other ar-
guments. 09 Once again the court vacated a decision based on
its "serious concern over potential abuse.""0 Here, as in
Sherman, there was no suggestion that there had been any
specific violation of the claimant's procedural. due process
rights."' Rather, because the agency did not promulgate
105. The court rather tersely dismissed the Board's argument that since the
employer's witnesses reaffirmed their telephone testimony in person, any infirmities
in the telephone process were rehabilitated. Id.
106. Id.
107. 520 A.2d 953 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
108. Id. at 953-54.
109. Id. at 954-55.
110. Id. at 954.
111. See id.
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regulations, even after the court warned of the consequences
of such failure, the testimony would not be allowed under the
circumstances. 112
Consistent with its position in Knisley, the commonwealth
court also declined to address concerns raised about telephone
hearings where there was no timely objection to the procedure
in Schneider v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review." 3 In this case, the claimant allegedly was
discharged for willful misconduct. The claimant was denied
benefits and appealed to a referee. At the hearing a representa-
tive of the employer, the claimant, and the claimant's attorney
were present in person. The employer's key witness testified
by telephone." 4
Prior to the hearing, the claimant's attorney was unaware
that the witness, one of the claimant's students, would testify
by telephone, but did not object immediately to the procedure.
The referee placed the call and the employer began its direct
examination. Due to technical difficulties, the call had to be
terminated and reestablished after considerable direct testi-
mony. When the referee attempted to renew the connection
with the witness, the claimant's attorney stated, "[T]o save
some time, we strongly object to [the student's] testimony." 5
The attorney offered no reason for the objection." 6
The referee affirmed the decision of the Office of Employment
Security and the claimant appealed to the Board of Review. The
claimant failed to raise the issue of the telephone testimony
with the Board, and the Board affirmed the referee. The court
quickly disposed of the claimant's argument that Knisley
required that the student's testimony be struck, finding that
the claimant raised the issue for the first time on appeal to the
court. Because the claimant did not raise the issue before the
Board, the issue was deemed to be waived." 7
In Schneider, the claimant did not show that the student's
telephone testimony in any way affected the claimant's due
process rights, and the court did not consider due process."'
112. Id. at 955.
113. 523 A.2d 1202 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
114. Id. at 1203. The claimant, a wood shop teacher, was discharged for allegedly
striking a student with a chisel. Id. The employer's key witness was the student who
was allegedly struck. Id.
115. Id.




Although the cases preceding Schneider make clear that no
showing of due process harm is required under Knisley, the
absence of such a showing in this case makes it difficult to fault
the court's decision with regard to the allowance of telephone
testimony. 119
Finally, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has
addressed due process issues raised in the context of a tele-
phone hearing, even in the absence of timely objection to the
procedure. 120 In Hoover v. Commonwealth Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review,12' the court addressed whether the
claimant's right to present evidence was "effectively foreclosed
by the inherent nature of the telephonic hearing."'22 The
claimant in Hoover was allegedly discharged for misconduct.
The Office of Employment Security denied him benefits, and
he appealed to a referee. The hearing consisted of a telephone
call between the referee and the claimant, in which the employ-
er did not participate. 123
The majority of the court took a convoluted approach to the
case. Citing its Knisley decision, the court noted that the
claimant had not objected to the nature of the hearing at, the
administrative level. 124 The court nonetheless found that "the
use of the telephone infringed upon the right of the claimant
to present evidence in his behalf."'25 The court reached this
conclusion because the claimant had attempted to offer docu-
mentary evidence of the falsity of the employer's claims, but
it was impossible for the hearing officer to examine the evi-
dence and determine its admissibility over the telephone. 126 The
hearing officer simply ignored the evidence. A more honest
analysis from the court in light of the hearing officer's decision
to ignore the employer's failure to sustain its burden of proof 27
would have been to find that the manner in which the hearing
119. The Schneider court reiterated that Knisley disallows testimony by telephone
as long as there is timely objection to it, at least until there are properly promulgated
regulations to safeguard due process rights. Id. at 1203.
120. E.g., Eddy v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
533 A.2d 191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Hoover v. Commonwealth Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd. of Review, 509 A.2d 962 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
121. 509 A.2d 962 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).





127. The dissenting judge would have found for the claimant on this basis. Id.
(Doyle, J., dissenting).
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officer conducted the hearing infringed upon the claimant's due
process rights, rather than to find that the defect was inherent
in the nature of the telephone hearing.
Similarly, in Eddy v. Commonwealth Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review,'12 the court found that the use of
the telephone hearing precluded the calling of witnesses. 29 The
claimant was denied benefits upon a referee's decision that the
claimant left his employment "without cause of a necessitous
and compelling nature."3 ° This was an interstate claim, and
the hearing was by telephone. Early in the hearing, and again
later in the hearing, the claimant informed the referee that he
wanted witnesses from his local union to testify. Apparently,
the referee was technically unable to add additional parties to
the hearing's telephone conference call: the referee told the
claimant that he did not have the equipment available to meet
the claimant's request. The record contained evidence that the
testimony of the excluded witnesses would have been relevant
and probative. 3 '
The court found that Knisley controlled, even though the
claimant did not object to the procedure. 3 2 The court correctly
found that the claimant's request for additional witness testi-
mony sufficiently preserved the issue for appellate review.'33
The court also took judicial notice that telephone companies
possess and market the technology to have conference calls
involving four or more participants at different locations.'34
However, rather than find that the referee erred in not offering
the claimant the opportunity for a continuance so that his wit-
nesses could be heard at a conference call, the court insisted
that the absence of regulations concerning telephone hearings
caused the problem.'35 The court acknowledged that the hearing
in this matter could only have been conducted by telephone,
because the parties and the referee were located in different
states.136 The remanded hearing also would be held by
128. 533 A.2d 191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
129. Id. at 192.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 193.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 193 n.5.
135. Id. at 193.
136. Id.
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telephone, presumably without regulations in place. 137 Under
Knisley, objection to the telephone procedure for the remanded
hearing would necessitate some kind of split hearing pro-
cedure. 13 8 Surely a split hearing would raise more compelling
due process issues than the telephone hearing process.
At least two other jurisdictions have addressed the question
of whether timely objection is necessary to preserve telephone
hearing issues for appeal. In the Florida case Greenberg v.
Simms Merchant Police Service,139 for example, the claimant
resided in New York when he filed his interstate claim for
unemployment benefits with Florida. He was initially denied
benefits and appealed. The Florida appeals referee advised him
that a hearing on his claim would be held in Florida and in the
form of a telephone conference. The claimant received specific
directions concerning the telephonic hearing and, as requested,
the claimant furnished a telephone number where he could be
reached for the conference. The issues were not complex and
each party was given the opportunity to testify, cross-examine,
and explain his side to the referee. Neither party introduced
or discussed documentary evidence at the hearing. 40
The Greenberg court, while finding that the claimant had not
raised any objection or disagreement with the telephone hear-
ing process until his court appeal, nonetheless addressed the
issues that the claimant raised in his appeal concerning
telephone hearings.' After analyzing the facts and circum-
stances attending the case, the court found that the telephone
hearing had been fair and the result correct. 142 This court's
action differs from that of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania discussed above. Although the Greenberg court suggested
that the claimant had waived the due process issues not raised
at the hearing, it went on to analyze the fundamental fairness
137. Since the parties were in different states, it would be difficult as a practical
matter to hold an in-person hearing. The Board's failure to promulgate regulations
from the time of Knisley, which was decided in 1985, through the Eddy decision two
years later, probably suggests that rules would not be promulgated before the hearing
pursuant to the remand in Eddy.
138. In interstate claim cases, where it is impractical to hold an in-person hearing
with both parties present at the same location, the only genuine alternative to a
telephone hearing is a split hearing in which the testimony of each party is taken in
person at that party's location, outside the presence of the other party. See supra text
accompanying notes 14-23.
139. 410 So. 2d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
140. Id. at 566-67.
141. Id. at 567.
142. Id. at 568.
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of the proceeding. 43 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
in contrast, seemed more intent on enforcing Knisley than on
determining fundamental fairness.
The Pennsylvania cases applying Knisley also may be prof-
itably contrasted with a similar case from New York. The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, addressed the due
process implications of a telephone procedure in In re Hoff-
man.144 In Hoffman, the claimant was denied unemployment
benefits on the grounds that he was discharged for misconduct.
The claimant appealed and a hearing was held, during which
a representative of the employer testified by telephone. The
claimant vigorously objected to this testimony by telephone, but
it was allowed over the claimant's objection. 145 The court held
that the claimant was not denied due process despite his
objection because the claimant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the employer's witness at length. 46 It should be noted
that telephone conferences are specifically authorized under
regulation in New York. 4 7 Nothing in the court's decision,
however, indicated that the existence of regulatory authority
for telephone hearings disposed of the matter.'48 Rather, the
decision appeared to rest upon the fact that the procedure
afforded the claimant all the process he was due.
The cases in this Part show that courts are unwilling to
approve automatically telephone hearings as within the dictates
of due process absent specific guidelines to govern the proce-
dure. Yet all too often, courts do not address these due process
issues because parties to the proceedings have failed to object
in a timely fashion.
B. Credibility Determinations Without
Observing Demeanor
Parties who challenge telephone hearings on due process
grounds most frequently allege that the lack of demeanor
analysis hinders or prevents credibility determinations in such
143. Id. at 566-68.
144. 525 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
145. Id. at 424.
146. Id. at 425.
147. Id.
148. The court explained in some detail what due process was required, id. at 424,
and only incidentally mentioned the regulatory permission for telephone testimony,
id. at 425.
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hearings. Courts have therefore developed an elaborate analysis
of this issue. In many cases, determining which of several
witnesses is telling the truth may be the key to reaching the
correct result. The question presented in the context of tele-
phone hearings is whether the fact finder can make adequate
credibility determinations absent observance of witness de-
meanor.
Lawyers profess that witness demeanor can be used to
identify the lying witness. Is the witness twitching? Is he
refusing to look the fact finder in the eye? Is he sweating in a
room that is not overly warm? Lawyers typically cite these
kinds of demeanor cues as ways of determining whether a
witness is lying, although some believe that "witness demeanor
is a very treacherous technique for assessing credibility." 149 Psy-
chological research indicates that many of the well-known
demeanor clues to credibility are indeterminate. 5 '
A majority of the courts that have addressed this issue has
purported to do a Mathews v. Eldridge15' balancing test in mak-
ing their determinations. In general, the courts have found
summarily that claimants' interests in the financial benefits
they were seeking were very important, as were the states'
interests in cost control and in ensuring that only eligible
individuals were awarded benefits. Those courts, however,
found the risk of an erroneous determination caused by not
observing demeanor virtually insignificant, thus swinging the
balance in favor of telephone hearings.
In Casey v. O'Bannon,152 a federal district court was asked
to decide whether due process demanded that applicants
rejected for public assistance receive face-to-face appeals
hearings, as opposed to telephone hearings. The defendant
agency had established new procedures whereby telephone
hearings via conference call could replace, at the applicant's
option, in-person hearings in cases where travel to a regional
hearing site would be onerous. The plaintiffs argued that the
new procedure effectively foreclosed them from having face-to-
face hearings and that the deprivation violated their due
process rights. The plaintiffs specifically argued that the
telephone hearing process deprived them and the hearing
149. Lareau & Sacks, supra note 31, at 155.
150. Id.; see also Corsi & Hurley, supra note 14, at 263 n.26 (noting that observers
cannot accurately determine when a person is lying).
151. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
152. 536 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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officer of the opportunity to judge demeanor properly. This for-
mat, the plaintiffs urged, made "meaningful cross-examination
of an adverse witness virtually impossible in that counsel can
neither gauge visual reactions of witnesses nor discern when
a witness testifies from memory or is using documents as an
aid."'53
The court side-stepped most of the issues that the plaintiffs
raised by accepting the defendants' assertion that they were
currently installing speaker phones in public assistance offic-
es. 15 ' The court opined that the only issue that could survive
the installation of the speaker phones was the question of
whether the hearing officer must have the opportunity to
observe demeanor and credibility.155 The Casey court held that
a hearing officer's visual analysis is not a constitutional
requirement of a hearing, finding that hearing officers can
effectively judge credibility over the telephone by noting tone
of voice, pauses, and levels of irritation.'56 The court agreed
that demeanor was a useful tool in making credibility de-
terminations, but it was not necessary to such determina-
tions. 1
57
In State ex rel. Human Services Department v. Gomez,"'8 the
plaintiff appealed his denial of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) benefits, arguing that the telephone hearing
he received violated due process. The New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals found that these hearings indeed violated due process.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico, however, adopted the
opinion of the court of appeals' dissenting judge, Judge Wood,
and held that telephone hearings were constitutional. 159 Judge
Wood noted that "demeanor" is not an aspect of the constitu-
tional right of confrontation under either New Mexico case law
or federal constitutional law and that Gomez's due process
rights would have been violated only if the hearing was not
153. Id. at 351.
154. Id. at 353. The speaker phones would permit all witnesses to be present at
one location, with only the hearing officer at a remote location. Id. The court avoided
the issue that witnesses may be aided by unseen and unheard third parties, and this
avoidance may have been premature, because the conference calling system that would
have rendered this issue moot was only "currently in the process" of being installed.
Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 353-54.
157. Id.
158. 657 P.2d 117 (N.M. 1983).
159. Id. at 118.
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conducted in a "meaningful manner."160 Here, the hearing was
conducted in a meaningful manner because the issue was essen-
tially a medical question as to whether the claimant was
disabled from working. 16 1 In fact, the documentary medical
evidence showed that the claimant genuinely believed that he
was unable to work, but that his belief was not accurate.
162
Therefore, the claimant's credibility played only a minor role
in making an accurate determination.
63
Interestingly, however, Gomez implied that where a witness's
credibility was an important factor, observing demeanor might
be more important to conduct the hearing in a "meaningful
manner." 64 The risk of error in not observing demeanor may
be greater where witness credibility is determinative of a mat-
ter than where it is not-after all, demeanor evaluations are
subjective in nature and are not susceptible to accurate mea-
surement in the judicial or quasi-judicial setting. The Gomez
court, however, suggests in dicta that seeing the witness might
reduce the rate of erroneous determinations to some extent. 65
The court does not detail, however, how observation of witness
demeanor might cure the increased risk. The obvious inference
is that visual cues would permit more accurate fact finding.
166
Other courts have found specifically that demeanor is not
determinative in making credibility assessments and, therefore,
that telephone hearings can properly give the hearing officer
adequate information upon which to determine credibility.'67
The majority view appears to agree with the court's dicta in
Slattery v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board168 that "a conference telephone hearing [is] an imagina-
tive attempt to solve the due process problems which inhere in




164. See id. at 124-25.
165. Id.
166. But see Lareau & Sacks, supra note 31, at 193 (arguing to the contrary).
167. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Simms Merchant Police Serv., 410 So. 2d 566, 567 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding telephone conferences far superior to written records in
determining credibility); Miller Memorial Nursing Ctr. v. Steinbacher, No. 1375, slip
op. at 9 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1989) (finding audio mechanism sufficient to assess
the witness's demeanor); Babcock v. Employment Div., 696 P.2d 19, 21 (Or. Ct. App.
1985) (determining that what a witness says and how he says it is of equal or greater
importance than demeanor in determining credibility).
168. 131 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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the simultaneous hearing concept."'69 These findings are not
based upon due process grounds, however, but are grounded
in common law determinations concerning demeanor. The
genuine due process analysis is given short shrift in these cas-
es, with great weight given to a finding, for example, that "in
a world of limited public resources ... the Division has a strong
interest in employing telephone hearings as an efficient and
fair response to its logistical limitations." 170 This consideration
is equivalent to the Slattery court's analysis of due process
concerns, despite the absence of any factual information upon
which to ground such a finding in Slattery.
17 1
Similarly, several courts have found telephone testimony
acceptable, particularly where the court has found that there
is no constitutional right to confrontation. 172 Courts that have
allowed testimony by telephone in court proceedings have
rested on the same grounds as courts in the administrative
context. 173
In contrast, at least one court has found important the
opportunity to observe demeanor in administrative hearings. 1
74
Courts that have declined to allow testimony by telephone in
civil litigation have determined, at least in part, that if the
testifying witness is not present for the fact finder to observe
his demeanor, testimony by telephone would violate the right
of confrontation, which includes the right of meaningful cross-
examination.
169. Id. at 424.
170. Babcock, 696 P.2d at 21.
171. Slattery concerned a hearing in which there was no telephone testimony.
Instead, simultaneous hearings were scheduled for the claimant and the employer,
at different locations. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 423. The Appeals Board's procedures provided
for a telephone hearing, but the claimant was not informed of such procedure. Id. at
424. The court's decision rested upon the Board's failure to give the claimant notice
of all of the procedures available to her. Id. at 425. Therefore, the court did not have
any facts relating to telephone hearings with which to perform a due process analysis.
172. See Michael J. Weber, Annotation, Permissibility of Testimony by Telephone
in State Trial, 85 A.L.R. 4TH 476, 487-93 (1991).
173. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal, 446 A.2d 808, 812 (Conn. 1982) (finding no
denial of due process where putative father in a hearing to terminate his parental
rights was denied a continuance that would have allowed him to appear in person
rather than by telephone); In re W.J.C., 369 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that the telephone testimony of court-appointed psychiatrist and psychologist
at a commitment hearing did not violate appellant's due process rights).
174. See Shaball v. State Compensation Ins. Auth., 799 P.2d 399, 405 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990) (finding that the hearing officer did not abuse discretion in refusing to hear
a witness's testimony by telephone where the witness's credibility was significant).
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In Shaball v. State Compensation Insurance Authority,'75 the
court held that the hearing officer did not err by prohibiting
a critical witness from testifying by telephone. 7 ' In Shaball,
the complainant appealed the decision of the State Personnel
Board, which upheld termination of her employment by a state
agency. The complainant, discharged for fraudulently allowing
payment of non-compensable workers' compensation claims,'77
wished to offer testimony of the person whose claims were
alleged to have been fraudulently paid. Due to personal prob-
lems, however, the witness was unable to appear in person at
the time and place of the hearing. The complainant requested
that the witness be allowed to testify by telephone. She neither
made an offer of proof as to the testimony to be offered nor
requested a continuance so that the witness could appear in
person. The complainant had earlier successfully blocked the
agency from having witnesses testify by telephone.' 78
The hearing officer declined to grant the request for the
witness to appear by telephone. The court concluded that the
hearing officer "apparently determined that claimant's credi-
bility was significant and that therefore she must testify in
person."'79 The court held that the hearing officer has discretion
to determine evidentiary matters and found no abuse of that
discretion. 8 0 Implicit in the court's decision was its belief that
where credibility is an important factor, observing demeanor
is at least a significant, if not necessary, assessment in making
a credibility determination.' 8'
Shaball is troublesome because the court effectively avoids
the due process implications of preventing an individual from
testifying. As noted above, the complainant's discharge revolved
around whether she had fraudulently allowed non-compensable
claims to be paid. 82 The court should not have required the
claimant to offer proof in order to determine whether the
individual whose claims allegedly were paid fraudulently would
have relevant evidence to offer. The Shaball decision suggests
that although the witness may have been absent from the
175. 799 P.2d 399 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id. at 405.
177. Id. at 401-02.




182. Id. at 402.
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hearing because of reasons beyond the witness's control,
183
those reasons should have been explored in greater depth.
Notwithstanding the complainant's objection to the telephone
testimony of agency witnesses, if the complainant's witness was
absent for reasons beyond the complainant's or the witness's
control, due process might require that the witness be allowed
to testify by telephone or that the complainant be offered a
continuance in order to take the witness's testimony in per-
son.184 The court's shallow analysis of this issue leaves the due
process concerns unresolved.
In summary, cases that have specifically addressed whether
the inability to observe witness demeanor deprives a party of
a fair hearing are not unanimous. None, however, flatly asserts
that a hearing can be fair only if it is face-to-face.' 85 The
majority of courts addressing the issue generally leans toward
finding that observation of demeanor is not critical to a fair
hearing because the fact finder has other tools available for
determining credibility. This tendency holds true in both the
administrative hearing context and in a variety of categories
of civil litigation.
Courts are nevertheless reluctant to assert that telephone
hearings are clearly permissible where the credibility of a
witness is the factor on which the case will turn. In such event,
some opinions suggest that viewing demeanor may be crucial
enough to require at least that the key witness's testimony be
taken face-to-face.' 86 As recently as 1994, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that "when credi-
bility determinations are not in issue, an [administrative] judge
may hold a hearing by telephonic means" under the applicable
statute. 87 Scientific evidence, however, suggests that the
usefulness of visual cues as a tool for determining truthfulness
is greatly overrated.188 Courts should, and apparently most
183. The witness had difficulties with her car and children. Id. at 405.
184. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
185. See, e.g., State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep'tv. Gomez, 657 P.2d 117, 125 (N.M.
1983) (rejecting the lower court's decision that the inability of the hearing officer to
observe the demeanor of witnesses denies a party due process of law).
186. See, e.g., Shaball, 799 P.2d at 405 (finding no abuse of discretion in denying
telephonic testimony where the witness's credibility was in issue); Gomez, 657 P.2d
at 124 (suggesting, in dicta, that in cases in which witness credibility may be
dispositive, the case may require a face-to-face hearing).
187. Bigby v. INS, 21 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted).
188. See, e.g., Corsi & Hurley, supra note 14, at 263-64.
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would, carefully consider reversing an administrative appeal
hearing solely on the ground of inability to observe demeanor.
C. A Party's Right to Present Witnesses
or Other Evidence
Only a few courts have addressed the issue of whether
telephone hearings adversely affect a party's right to present
witnesses and evidence. None have condemned the telephone
hearing process in this context per se. Some courts, however,
have found defects in the conduct of the telephone hearing that
violated a party's due process rights. Although particular courts
have found a party's due process rights to have been affected
adversely, each made clear that the defect was curable without
eliminating telephone hearings.
In Hoover v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 8 9 the court found that, under the circum-
stances of the case, the use of telephone hearings infringed
upon the claimant's right to present evidence on his behalf.190
Similarly, in Eddy v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review, 9' the court found that the particular
telephone procedure the agency used in this case prevented a
party from presenting witnesses.'92
In neither Hoover nor Eddy did the court engage in due
process balancing in reaching a decision. Instead, the court
found that not permitting parties to present all evidence and
testimony that they believed necessary violated general hearing
requirements. 193 In both Hoover and Eddy, the defects, while
perhaps attributable to the telephone hearing process, might
have been easily cured. In Hoover, for example, the hearing
officer could have held the record open to receive the claimant's
documentary evidence and reopened the hearing, if necessary,
after its receipt.' 94 The hearing officer in Eddy could have
189. 509 A.2d 962 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
190. Id. at 963; see supra text accompanying notes 118-22.
191. 533 A.2d 191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
192. Id. at 193; see supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
193. Eddy, 533 A.2d at 193; Hoover, 509 A.2d at 963.
194. This practice is common in administrative hearings. It is not unusual for
unrepresented parties to fail to realize the importance of certain documentary evidence
until the hearing officer or administrative law judge brings it to their attention. Such
a practice would be consistent with the decision in Hoover. See Hoover, 509 A.2d at 963.
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granted a continuance in order to make arrangements with the
telephone company to establish a four-party conference call.' 95
In both cases, the court made clear its belief that properly
promulgated regulations for telephone hearings may have
obviated the need for a remand in either case.' 96 Such regula-
tions could have included a notice provision informing parties
how such matters would be handled in the context of a tele-
phone hearing.
197
Of course, in order for regulations to address concerns of this
type, they must be communicated successfully to the parties
subject to them. The suggestion that regulations would cure all
of the difficulties that might arise in the context of telephone
hearings naively assumes that a regulatory authority will
effectively anticipate them all. In practice, it is likely that
regulations will be silent on a variety of circumstantial difficul-
ties, which would then remain unaddressed until the next
round of formal rulemaking. Informal policy making by the
hearing authority, however, would provide the flexibility
required to address the ever-changing landscape of telephone
hearings.
98
Another facet of possible evidentiary limitations in telephone
hearings arises in the context of witness subpoenas. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that while, in general, telephone
hearings might withstand due process challenges, the telephone
hearing procedure should comport as nearly as possible with
the in-person hearing procedure with regard to due process
rights.' 99 In Schexnider v. Blache,00 the agency's telephone
195. As noted above, the court took judicial notice that telephone companies had
the technical capability to implement such conference calls. Eddy, 533 A.2d at 193
n.5.
196. See id. at 193; Hoover, 509 A.2d at 963.
197. See Eddy, 533 A.2d at 193.
198. In fact, Pennsylvania promulgated regulations relating to telephone hearings,
effective April 8, 1989. 34 PA. CODE §§ 101.121-.126 (1996). As might be expected,
those regulations attempt to address the issues raised in the various Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court decisions, but do not address other foreseeable circumstances
related to telephone hearings. For example, the regulations provide that documents
that are not delivered to the hearing tribunal in advance of the hearing may only be
admitted with the consent of all parties. Id. § 101.124(e). Such a regulation does not
address a situation in which relevant documents may be discovered with insufficient
time for delivery to the tribunal. Under the existing regulation, such documents may
only be admitted to the record with the consent of all parties, thus giving the opposing
party essential control of whether a relevant document will be admitted.
199. Schexnider v. Blache, 504 So. 2d 864, 867 (La. 1987).
200. 504 So. 2d 864 (La. 1987).
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hearing instructions failed to inform parties regarding the
procedure for subpoenaing witnesses. The instructions merely
indicated that if a party wanted to include witnesses in the
hearing, it was the party's responsibility to make sure that the
witnesses were available at the party's telephone.2 ' In Schex-
nider, the claimant had two witnesses who would not appear
voluntarily and who therefore did not testify at the hearing.
The court remanded the case, holding that "the plaintiffs' due
process rights could only be protected sufficiently by an oppor-
tunity to subpoena the witnesses for the telephone hearing
involved in this case."2 °2
The Schexnider court, as well as the courts in Eddy and
Hoover, made clear that it was not merely the idea of telephone
hearings that resulted in findings of due process violations.2 3
Rather, these courts found that the safeguards in place were
insufficient to insure that the parties' due process rights would
not be violated. 204 These courts clearly suggested that with such
procedural safeguards, there would be no question as to wheth-
er telephone hearings violated due process.
D. The Ability of the Hearing Officer
to Control the Hearing
No court has held flatly that a telephone hearing prevents
the hearing officer from adequately controlling the hearing. The
issue has seldom been raised in the reported cases; on at least
two occasions, however, courts have dealt with some aspect of
this issue.20 5
201. Id. at 865.
202. Id. at 867.
203. See id. at 866; Eddy v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 533 A.2d 191, 193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Hoover v. Commonwealth Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 509 A.2d 962, 963 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
(citing Knisley v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501
A.2d 1180, 1182 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)).
204. See Schexnider, 504 So. 2d at 866; Eddy, 533 A.2d at 193; Hoover, 509 A.2d
at 963 (citing Knisley, 501 A.2d at 1182).
205. See Dey v. Edward G. Smith & Assocs., 719 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Idaho 1986);
Chobertv. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 484 A.2d 223,
225 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
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In Dey v. Edward G. Smith & Associates,"' the court re-
manded the case for an in-person hearing because, under the
particular circumstances of the case, the telephone hearing did
not provide a complete or orderly basis for the resolution of the
dispute.0 7 In Dey, the claimant was allowed unemployment
benefits and the employer appealed; the hearing examiner
conducted the appeals hearing by telephone. The hearing
examiner issued a decision adverse to the claimant after the
telephone hearing, and the claimant appealed to the Industrial
Commission, requesting a hearing. Both the claimant and the
employer asserted that additional evidence would be offered at
the hearing. The Commission denied an additional hearing and
summarily affirmed the ruling of the appeals examiner.0 8
On appeal from the Commission's decision, the Idaho Su-
preme Court recognized the usefulness of telephone hearings
in a large array of cases.20 9 In this case, however, the court
found that there had been several telephone disconnections,
and the proceedings were heated, argumentative, and repeated-
ly interrupted. 210 As a result, the court was unable to determine
what was testimony, what testimony was lost, and the basis
of the decision.2 " Thus, the Dey court's remand is understand-
able under the circumstances. If the court could not determine
the basis for the appeals examiner's decision, the Commission
must have been similarly unable to make such a determination.
Thus, the court correctly found that the Commission abused
its discretion in refusing an additional hearing.
Such problems with telephone hearings might be avoided if
the hearing officer gives adequate instructions at the com-
mencement of the hearing, together with admonitions or
continuances if matters become so unruly that the hearing is
no longer "fair." It is also true, however, that similar circum-
stances can attend in-person hearings. The tenor of the Dey
court's decision suggested, however, that the problem with the
record resulted from conducting the hearing by telephone.212
The decision, however, does not suggest why the court might
206. 719 P.2d 1206 (Idaho 1986).
207. Id. at 1208.
208. Id. at 1207.
209. Id. at 1208.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The court remanded the case in order to create a "complete and orderly"
record, specifically ordering that the hearing be held before the Industrial Commission,
and not by telephone. Id.
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have reached such a conclusion, apart from the technical pos-
sibility of disconnecting one or more teleconferencing parties.21
Dey articulates no reason for believing that telephone hearings
are more susceptible to disorder than in-person hearings. The
true issue in Dey was not that the telephone hearing violated
any specific due process rights, but rather, that the record of
the hearing was insufficient for a reasonable review.
The court in Chobert v. Commonwealth Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review214 did not condemn the practice of
conducting administrative hearings or examining of witnesses
by telephone conference call.215 In a hearing where neither
party was represented by counsel, and the referee telephoned
an employer witness for testimony without advance notice to
the claimant, however, the court held that the hearing did not
comport with fundamental fairness."'
The problem addressed in Chobert is one more common to
telephone hearings than to in-person hearings, i.e., the problem
of witnesses using documents as the basis of their testimony,
sometimes without the court's or parties' knowledge. If a
witness testifies in person, all involved can observe whether
he is referring to documents and can effectively determine what
those documents are and what ought to be done with them. The
opposing party has the opportunity to view the documents and
cross-examine the witness about them. In Chobert, however,
it was apparent that a telephonic witness was testifying with
reference to documents.217 It might have been useful had the
hearing officer cautioned the witness to testify only to the best
of his recollection and not to refer to any document without
informing the hearing officer and the parties. If the witness
were unable to testify from recollection, the hearing could have
been continued and the witness given the opportunity to submit
the document to which he was referring for distribution to the
parties and the hearing officer. Proper treatment of the docu-
ment or documents could have taken place at the continued
hearing, thereby rendering the court's concerns moot.
213. Hearing participants, from time to time, become disorderly, necessitating
censure and even continuance of the hearing. For example, when the issue and the
personalities are such that the parties' mere presence together results in aggressive
contentiousness, the presiding officer is compelled to bring the parties under control
in order to create a reviewable record.
214. 484 A.2d 223 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
215. See id. at 225.
216. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
217. Chobert, 484 A.2d at 224.
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No cases have been found in which a court has pointedly
addressed the questions of how to ensure that a telephone
witness is testifying without undetected reference to documents
or coaching. Those questions, raised by appellants and often
bypassed by courts,218 are more meaty than the previously
discussed demeanor question. The courts have not addressed
in any meaningful way how the issues of sequestration of
witnesses, suspected coaching, or even an impostor witness may
effectively be addressed.
III. SURVEY OF IN-PERSON AND TELEPHONE HEARINGS
An important dimension of this research lies in the compar-
ison of in-person with telephone hearings. We wished to learn
if a measurable difference existed from a procedural, as well
as an outcome-based, standpoint between in-person and
telephone hearings. We developed a process whereby two-party
separation cases in Maine and California were surveyed in a
period of just over a year and the results compiled and ana-
lyzed. The areas of inquiry focused on the opportunities to
submit evidence, the opportunities for representation, the
opportunities for confrontation, default rates, and outcomes.
We chose Maine and California as the survey states because
we administer appeals programs there and have direct access
to and control over information gathering and reporting activi-
ties. Additionally, because of the significant differences in the
states' geographic, economic, and demographic characteristics,
similarities in the survey outcomes would tend to validate the
results.
A. Telephone Policy
Both Maine and California grant a party permission to
appear by telephone in limited and carefully defined circum-
stances.219 In both states, hearings are scheduled in a location
218. See, e.g., Casey v. O'Bannon, 536 F. Supp. 350, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
219. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 5041(c) (1995). Maine has adopted an unprom-
ulgated policy for telepone hearings.
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near to the place of filing of the claim. If the claimant has
relocated to a place distant from where the claimant last
worked and the employer is a party to the appeal, the employer
will be allowed to appear at the hearing by telephone and is
typically not required to travel a significant distance to the
hearing site. In Maine, the general rule is that, if a party is
situated more than thirty miles from the hearing site, the party
will be permitted to appear by telephone. California has
adopted the same policy for parties more than fifty miles from
the hearing site. If the claimant worked at an employer's
establishment that is in the vicinity of the hearing site, the
employer will be required to appear in person, even though its
headquarters, including its personnel office, is located else-
where. In interstate cases, the claimant will always be in a
distant location and will always be scheduled to appear by
telephone.
Both Maine and California allow exceptions to the general
policy that parties who are located in the vicinity of the hearing
site must appear in person. Both states have restrictive policies
regarding continuances. 220 Thus, a party who requests a con-
tinuance because she may be seriously inconvenienced by
appearing in person could be granted a telephone hearing as
an alternative. For example, if a witness critical to the em-
ployer's case is scheduled to be out of town on the hearing date,
a telephone hearing may be granted in lieu of a continuance.
If, however, that individual is not a critical witness, then
another individual would be required to appear in person on
behalf of the employer. Similarly, if a claimant has a job
interview in another city on the hearing date, the claimant
would usually be allowed to appear by telephone. Also, both
states will set telephone hearings in remote locations where
there are not enough cases to fill a calendar and where a case
would otherwise be delayed beyond thirty days. Both states will
also set a case for a telephone hearing where it is known that
a participant might present a serious security risk, but this
circumstance is extremely rare.
In both states, key staff screen requests for telephone hear-
ings pursuant to preexisting guidelines. A telephone hearing
will be granted only where such a hearing is clearly the more
desirable procedure, given all the circumstances of the
220. Both states have adopted unpromulgated policies for the consideration of
continuance requests.
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particular situation. With the exception of interstate hearings,
cases that fall within these guidelines may still be heard in
person if the case involves substantial documentation or
numerous witnesses. Of course, parties who wish to appear in
person have the option of doing so, even if they are located
beyond the designated distance from the hearing site.
All of these guidelines are limited by the information avail-
able to the staff at the time of scheduling the cases. For
instance, a case falling within the guidelines may be set for a
telephone hearing, but at the hearing many documents and wit-
nesses may be presented. The hearing officers have discretion
to continue such cases at a later time as they do in in-person
hearings.
B. Methodology
In Maine and California, we surveyed all two-party separa-
tion cases, that is, cases involving a voluntary quit or a dis-
charge221 in which both the claimant and the employer were
parties, between October 30, 1994, and January 13, 1995. Cases
heard during the week between Christmas and New Year's Day
were not surveyed because we believed the default rate would
be abnormally high.
In California, we surveyed those cases heard by the Central
Sacramento Office of Appeals. That office's service area includes
the Napa and lower Sacramento Valleys and a portion of the
northern Sierra. The population and economy of this area is
expanding and is dominated by manufacturing, agriculture and
food processing, government, commercial and financial services,
and tourism. The area is generally representative of the
California economy as a whole. The Central Sacramento office
has ten out-station hearing sites across its service area, as well
as a multi-room hearing complex at its Sacramento headquar-
ters. This office also hears most of California's interstate
appeals. In Maine, we surveyed all two-party separation cases
statewide. Maine is sparsely populated with 1.25 million people;
stretches 400 miles south to north and has over 3500 miles of
Atlantic shoreline.
221. A voluntary quit occurs when the claimant initiates the separation from
employment. Conversely, a discharge occurs when the employer creates the separation.
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We attached a copy of the survey form to the front of each
case folder. The registration staff entered the case number on
the form. The hearing officer to whom the case was assigned
was responsible for completing the bulk of the survey form and
noting the appearances of the parties and the manner by which
the parties appeared, that is, in person or by telephone. If a
party failed to appear, the hearing officer so noted the informa-
tion. The survey also asked whether the decision was favorable,
unfavorable, or whether the appeal was dismissed because the
appellant failed to appear at the hearing.
The hearing officers were also asked to record the age of the
case, but we later realized that more than ninety percent of the
cases surveyed were heard within thirty days of the appeal. We
therefore concluded that the age of the case was not a statisti-
cally significant factor, and those results were not compiled.
The hearing officers also noted whether the claimant or the
employer were represented at the hearing, and whether the
representative was an attorney or a non-attorney. The officer
recorded the number of witnesses who testified at the hearing
for both the claimant and the employer, in addition to the
parties themselves. We asked the hearing officers to record the
number of witnesses added after the start of the hearing. We
believed that in the case of a telephone hearing, a party might
call a witness to the telephone to testify when it became appar-
ent to the party that the witness's testimony could be helpful.
That option generally would not be available in an in-person
hearing. The officer also recorded the number of documents in
addition to the agency documents that were transmitted with
the appeal that each party offered. Furthermore, the officer
noted the number of subpoenas that the claimant and the em-
ployer requested and whether a party cross-examined an oppos-
ing witness. Finally, higher-authority appeals from surveyed
cases were tabulated.
IV. MAINE SURVEY RESULTS
A. Outcomes (Appendices III and IV)
In Maine, of the 208 in-person cases surveyed,222 129 involved
claimant appellants. The claimant prevailed in fifty-nine cases
222. The survey instrument used in Maine is printed in Appendix I, infra p. 461.
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(44%). In telephone hearings, eighty-seven involved claimant
appellants. The claimants prevailed in twenty-three cases
(26%).
Of the seventy-nine employer in-person appeals, the em-
ployers prevailed in twenty-four cases (32%). And of the thirty-
four employer telephone appeals, the employers prevailed in
eleven cases (32%).
Dismissals occurred in eighteen cases (9%) for in-person hear-
ings and six cases (5%) for the telephone hearings. The dis-
missals were roughly evenly divided between claimants and
employers.
B. Representation (Appendices V and VI)
Attorney or non-attorney representation was higher for both
claimants and employers in in-person hearings than it was in
telephone hearings. In thirty-four cases (16%) claimants had
in-person representation, compared to six cases (5%) in tele-
phone hearings. Employers had a similar rate of representation
as claimants: thirty-four employers (15%) were represented at
in-person hearings. At twelve cases (10%), employers had a
relatively consistent rate of representation in telephone hear-
ings-it did not drop as much as it did for claimants.
C. Non-Party Witnesses
(Appendices VII Through X)
In tabulating the results, we aggregated the total number of
witnesses for the sample. For instance, at in-person hearings,
claimants called fifty-two witnesses (25%). In telephone hear-
ings, by contrast claimants called only nine witnesses, or in 7%
of the hearings.
Employers called significantly fewer witnesses in telephone
hearings than in in-person hearings. At in-person hearings, the
employers called eighty-four witnesses (in roughly 40% of these
hearings, on average) while at telephone hearings they called
twenty-six witnesses (roughly averaging 21% of telephone
hearings).
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Administrative law in Maine provides that the agency issue
subpoenas as a ministerial duty; it does not have discretion to
refuse to issue them.223 There are some obvious limitations on
out-of-state subpoenas. Nevertheless, the use of subpoenas was
limited significantly by telephone hearings. Claimants at in-
person hearings issued subpoenas against thirty-three witness-
es (on average, roughly 16% of cases). At telephone hearings,
five witnesses were subpoenaed (4%). Employers requested
subpoenas less frequently in both instances. At in-person
hearings, nine subpoenas were issued (4%). No subpoenas were
requested in the 121 telephone hearings.
D. Introduction of Documents at Hearing
(Appendices IX Through XII)
Use of documents was noticeably reduced in telephone hear-
ings. As noted above, the use of documents during telephone
hearings requires more preparation and hearing time. Using
the same convention of aggregating the number of documents,
the survey found that claimants submitted eighty-one docu-
ments in in-person hearings (averaging 39% of the hearings)
and thirty-one documents in the telephone hearings (averaging
25%). The decline was even more noticeable in employers'
practice, however. At in-person hearings, they submitted 222
documents (an overwhelming 106% of the hearings if averaged),
but at telephone hearings, the number declined to forty-three
documents (averaging 35% of the hearings).
E. Cross-Examination
Cross-examination rates were essentially the same for in-
person and telephone hearings. Between 42% and 45% of
claimants and employers took advantage of cross-examination
during both in-person and telephone settings.
There was a material difference between in-person and tele-
phone hearings in developing the evidence. In-person hearings
223. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9060(1) (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 1082(8) (West 1988).
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have more witnesses, subpoenas, and documents in every cate-
gory of case. The parties do not bring as many live witnesses
and written statements to a telephone hearing. Both claimants
and employers are more likely to bring additional evidence to
in-person hearings.
V. CALIFORNIA SURVEY RESULTS
In California, we surveyed a total of 581 cases, 224 313 of
which were telephone hearings and 278 of which were in-person
hearings. Two hundred sixty-three of the telephone hearings
were interstate cases.
A. Outcomes (Appendices III and IV)
In California, of the 278 in-person cases surveyed, 181
involved claimant appellants, and of those, 127 were decided
on the merits. The claimant prevailed in 32% of these total
cases, but prevailed in 47% of cases actually decided on the
merits. Of the 313 telephone hearings surveyed, 223 involved
claimant appellants, and 178 of these were decided on the
merits. The claimants prevailed in only 24% of these total cases
(30% on the merits), a substantially lower rate.
Ninety-seven of the in-person hearings involved employer
appellants, and sixty-eight of these cases were decided on the
merits. The employer prevailed in 41% of these total cases (58%
on the merits). Ninety-one of the telephone hearings involved
employer appellants, and sixty-six of these were decided on the
merits. The employer prevailed in 46% of these total cases (64%
on the merits).
California experienced a higher rate of appeals from decisions
in telephone hearings than did Maine. The in-person appeal
rate was 13.3%, while the telephone hearing rate was 16%.
Projected on a statewide basis, this difference is significant in
terms of the absolute numbers of higher-authority appeals that
might be generated if all lower-authority cases were heard by
telephone.
224. The survey instrument used in California is printed in Appendix II, infra
p. 464.
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B. Representation (Appendices V and VI)
Persons representing claimants and employers in California
generally were not attorneys. Claimants were represented in
only a tiny fraction of surveyed cases, in six of the 278 in-
person hearings (2%), and in three of the 313 telephone hear-
ings (1%). Employer representation was markedly greater. They
were represented in fifty-nine of the in-person cases (21%) and
in sixty-six of the telephone cases (21%). Based on these
figures, it appears that representation was not significantly
affected by the hearing format.
C. Non-Party Witnesses
(Appendices VII Through X)
As in Maine, the format of the hearing had a significant
impact on whether parties called witnesses to testify. In the in-
person hearings, thirty-three witnesses testified on behalf of
claimants (averaging 12%) but only eight were called to testify
at telephone hearings (averaging 3%). Employers brought
seventy-four witnesses to the in-person hearings (averaging
27%) but only forty-seven to the telephone hearings (averaging
15%).
D. Introduction of Documents at Hearing
(Appendices IX Through XII)
Survey results for document introduction also paralleled
those in Maine. Claimants introduced 105 documents at in-
person hearings while employers introduced 108 documents.
By contrast, claimants introduced only twenty-six documents
at telephone hearings while employers submitted eighty-one.
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E. Cross-Examination
As in Maine, the hearing format did not affect whether
parties exercised their right of cross-examination. Claimants
cross-examined at forty of the in-person hearings and in forty-
three of the telephone hearings. Employers exercised their right
to cross-examine in sixty-two of the in-person hearings and in
fifty-nine of the telephone hearings.
VI. OBSERVATIONS FROM SURVEY RESULTS
Administrative fair hearings are structured to assure that
parties have a full opportunity to state their cases and that the
outcome of the hearing is correct under the law, given the facts
of the case.225 It seems clear from the compiled data that parties
avail themselves of these procedural devices with less frequency
in telephone hearings than in in-person hearings. This conclu-
sion is true notwithstanding the fact that the cases heard by
telephone were screened carefully before the telephone hearing
was granted.
A survey result of some concern is that claimants were less
likely to prevail in telephone hearings than at in-person hear-
ings. It could be argued that the telephone hearings presented
a different mix of cases. A notable feature of the California re-
sults is that eighty-four percent of the surveyed telephone
hearings were interstate cases, which in our experience gen-
erally involve voluntary leaving issues. California's voluntary
quit statute, however, does not have a connection with work
provision, a factor that should militate strongly in favor of
claimants in this type of case.226 Moreover, only ten percent of
the surveyed telephone hearings in Maine were interstate
cases, yet in both states claimant success rates dropped sharply
in telephone hearings.
The similarity in survey outcomes between the two states
would seem to discount the possible difference in the mix of
225. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1951 (West 1986).
226. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). Many interstate
cases involve voluntary quits to follow a spouse. Such a separation is for good cause
under this statute and thus entitles the claimant to benefits under this statute. Id.
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cases as a significant factor in accounting for the disparity in
outcomes. Instead, it suggests that the telephone hearing
format, with its diminished opportunities for claimants to
present their cases, accounts for this result. If so, this would
trigger the second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test, that
is, that telephone hearings may increase the risk of an erro-
neous deprivation of benefits.227 While the mix of cases may be
a minor factor, the data indicate that, as a group, telephone
hearings offer different procedural characteristics from an
evidentiary standpoint. Considering the totality of the commu-
nication, both the quantity of the evidence and the quality of
the testimony are diminished in telephone hearings. The data
do not warrant a conclusion that telephone hearings are unfair
to claimants. They do, however, point to a trend, driven by
procedural characteristics, favoring one group over another.
This trend underscores the importance of establishing individu-
alized standards for scheduling hearings by telephone.
If the loss of procedural protections and the disparity in
outcomes in telephone hearings are present where cases are
carefully screened, it seems likely that these differences would
be magnified if there were no screening criteria or if the tele-
phone format were employed strictly for economic purposes.
This consideration raises the third prong of the Mathews v.
Eldridge test, that is, what administrative gain or economic
benefit, if any, is realized in telephone hearings. In Maine and
California, where geographical separation of the parties is the
primary criterion for granting a telephone hearing, the benefit
is clear. It permits both parties to be heard at the same time
by the same hearing officer and for the parties to hear and
respond to one another. If telephone hearings were employed
as a general practice, economic factors would be the primary
means of justifying the result. The economic benefit would be
two-fold: no loss of hearing officer time and travel costs, and
no rental costs for out-station hearing facilities. In return,
however, other costs increase. Lengthy, long distance, telephone
conference calls are expensive. Additionally, since the entire
administrative record must be duplicated and mailed to the
parties prior to the hearing, staffing and postage costs increase.
There are also additional equipment costs for duplicating as
well as for telecommunications equipment. Telephone hearings,
at least in California, also result in more higher-authority
227. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Telephone Hearings
456 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
appeals and thus higher cost. Although it was beyond the scope
of this project to measure with precision the economic factors
involved in telephone versus in-person hearings, we suspect
that any real savings resulting from telephone hearings would
be elusive and difficult to identify. It is therefore logical to con-
clude that there is insufficient administrative economic justi-
fication for an across-the-board implementation of telephone
hearings as replacement for in-person hearings.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The due process balancing test is not only for use by the
courts. It must be applied in each instance or decision that
requires determination of whether to hold a hearing in person
or by telephone. An agency that thoughtfully applies the
balancing test will produce the best result for both the parties
and the agency. Due process problems causing fundamental
unfairness to any party will usually be avoided with close
attention to details.
Telephone hearings do not, ipso facto, violate due process of
law. Properly structured, they can provide for a "meaningful
opportunity" to be heard. They do not fatally impair the fact
finder's ability to make demeanor credibility determinations.
Nor do they necessarily impede the ability of the hearing officer
to control the hearing. The Maine and California surveys es-
tablish, however, that telephone hearings reduce the number
of documents and witnesses and may therefore interfere with
the parties' rights to present witnesses and other evidence.
That result may be a function of the screening process that
Maine and California use for setting cases for hearing by
telephone. It also may be a function of the telephone hearing
process which inhibits parties from exercising their rights to
present evidence on their behalf. Telephone hearings also seem
to diminish slightly the parties' satisfaction with the proceed-
ings, as the appeal rate for telephone hearings is somewhat
higher than for in-person hearings. Telephone hearings may
be a less satisfactory means of finding the truth.
Telephone hearings clearly have their place in present-day
unemployment compensation appeals. They are a highly desir-
able alternative to the split hearing procedure of an earlier era.
They are also useful in particular situations in which the
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hearing might otherwise be delayed or in which an in-person
hearing might be unduly burdensome to one or both of the
parties.
In determining whether to conduct a hearing by telephone,
economic savings, if any, are not alone sufficient to be deter-
minative. Such savings cannot compensate fully for the loss of
opportunity for the parties to present their cases most effec-
tively. Consideration of economic factors, without more, could
be a violation of due process. We recommend that, as a matter
of policy, telephone hearings should not be employed or con-
demned universally in any jurisdiction. The telephone hearing
should be limited on a case-by-case basis to those situations in
which it is clearly the preferable format as determined after
consideration of the factors set forth below:
1. THE COMPLEXITY AND GRAVITY OF THE ISSUE. Is the
issue a relatively simple one, such as an able and
available case involving disqualification for only
one week, or a complex fraud case with the possi-
bility of a large overpayment and lengthy disqual-
ification? The seriousness of the consequences of an
erroneous decision militates against a telephone
hearing in the latter case.
2. THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF WITNESSES. Are the one
or two parties going to be the only witnesses, or are
there likely to be several witnesses offering testi-
mony for each party? The difficulty of controlling
a hearing with multiple witnesses suggests that in
the latter case, a telephone hearing may not be
suitable.
3. THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS. Many docu-
ments can lead to greater confusion both as to what
documents are being referenced and as to whether
a witness might refer to a document not part of the
record. Even with few documents, it is prudent for
an agency to establish a policy concerning when
documents are to be submitted and distributed to
other parties. It is obviously preferable for docu-
ments to be exchanged prior to the hearing, and
developing a mechanism for doing so is important.
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4. LANGUAGE OR OTHER COMMUNICATION BARRIERS. Al-
though foreign language translators may be used
in telephone hearings, experience shows that com-
munication is, by and large, facilitated when the
translator can see the witness and the witness can
see the translator. The benefits and risks of other
communication problems must also be carefully
weighed.
5. THE DISTANCE OF THE PARTIES FROM THE NEAREST
HEARING LOCATION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CLIMATE
CONDITIONS WHERE APPROPRIATE. Where one party
would be significantly burdened by appearing in
person, all other things being equal, the agency
must decide whether it will allow one party to
appear in person and one by telephone. An ap-
pearance of unfairness may be avoided by requiring
all parties to participate in the same manner,
either in person or by telephone.
6. THE COST OF IN-PERSON VERSUS TELEPHONE HEAR-
ING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, AND OVERALL.
If cases are analyzed individually, some will emerge as
obviously suitable for telephone hearing, while others will be
equally obviously unsuitable for such a hearing. Individual
examination of the above factors, however, will reduce signifi-
cantly the number of cases inappropriately scheduled as either
in-person or telephone hearings. The rights of the parties will
be protected better if consideration of relevant factors takes
place before a hearing is scheduled.
Once it has been determined that a case is suitable for
scheduling by telephone, attention is drawn to the conduct of
the hearing itself. An agency must have either formal or
informal procedures that will insure that the due process
concerns addressed in the case law are taken into consider-
ation. For example, a hearing officer must take care to as-
certain the identity of those participating. There should also
be explicit pre-hearing instructions concerning sequestration
of witnesses, reference to documents that are not part of the
record, and coaching or other assistance by third parties. The
hearing officer must be vigilant throughout the course of the
hearing and admonish parties during the hearing if the hearing
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officer suspects, for example, that a party is testifying with the
assistance of a document not part of the record. The agency
must also have a system in place for a pre-hearing exchange
of documents, as well as alternative approaches in the event
documents that have not been disseminated are offered in the
course of the hearing. These types of issues reinforce the need
to carefully pre-screen cases to determine their suitability for
telephone hearings.
Agencies should keep an open mind about the use of tele-
phone hearings. In the majority of cases, in-person hearings
will be preferable. In a substantial number of cases, however,
conducting a hearing by telephone will provide a convenient
forum for all concerned and a result consistent with funda-
mental fairness. An all-or-nothing approach to telephone hear-
ings runs the risk of mandating telephone hearings where they
are not appropriate and denying such hearings in circumstances
where they are appropriate. It would be an error to eliminate
the application of sound and considered judgment in determin-
ing whether a case should be heard telephonically or in person.
CONCLUSION
Telephone hearings began as a desirable alternative to con-
ducting separate hearings when the parties were geographi-
cally distant from each other. Today there is a trend among
the states to conduct hearings by telephone with increasing
frequency and without regard to the location of the parties.
The reasons cited for this trend are primarily economic. Al-
though telephone hearings have their place in present-day
unemployment insurance appeals, research conducted in
conjunction with this Article has found that they result in a
dissipation of procedural protections and a diminished eviden-
tiary base. Telephone hearings should therefore be utilized in
place of in-person hearings only in carefully defined circum-
stances.
Federal case law provides a due process framework to analyze
the impact of diminished protections resulting from new pro-
cedures such as telephone hearings. Essentially, the test ques-
tions whether and to what extent the use of the new procedure
increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of an important
private interest. If it does, courts examine the value and cost
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of additional procedural safeguards. Federal courts have held
that administrative economy or convenience alone is not a com-
plete defense to a challenge based upon deprivation of due
process.
State courts that have considered challenges to telephone
hearings in unemployment compensation cases generally have
supported the use of telephone hearings where they are con-
ducted with sufficient procedural safeguards. In the context of
demeanor credibility determinations, while many courts have
expressed reservations in this area, no reported case flatly
asserts that a hearing can be fair only if it is conducted face-to-
face. An important component of this Article is a survey of
several hundred cases, designed to compare in-person and
telephone hearings at several points of inquiry. The surveys
reveal that parties were much less likely to subpoena or call
witnesses and introduce documentary evidence in telephone
hearings than at in-person hearings. Both the quantity of the
evidence and the quality of the testimony are diminished in
telephone hearings. While the hearing format did not seem to
affect outcomes for employers, claimants were less likely to
prevail in telephone hearings than at in-person hearings. We
suggest that the telephone hearing format, with its diminished
opportunities for claimants to present their cases, accounts for
this result. This is not to say that telephone hearings are
fundamentally unfair to claimants. Properly structured, they
can provide for a meaningful opportunity to be heard. These
factors, however, underscore the importance of establishing
individualized standards for scheduling hearings by telephone.
Cost savings alone are insufficient to justify a telephone
hearing. Rather, all considerations bearing upon the rights of
the parties must be taken into account when deciding whether
to hear an unemployment compensation appeal by telephone.
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APPENDIX II
CALIFORNIA SURVEY INSTRUMENT
CASE NUMBER INTERSTATE (Y or N)




2. ____Appellant (C or E)
3. -Reopening Request: _Clmt _ER
4. Decision: Effect on appellant (fav; unf; dis n/a)
5. ___Time Lapse: Enter 30, 45, or 75
6. Representation: Attorney or Non-Attorney Rep (A or N)
Clmt / ER
7. No. of additional witnesses _ Clmt /_ER
8. No. of witnesses added after start of hearing Clmt / ER
No. of subpoenas/SDT's issued/denied
issued/denied / Clmt / ER
9. No. of documents offered by parties: __ Clmt / ER
10. Did parties cross-examine (Y or N) __ Clmt I ER
11. Reason for continuance (if applicable)
Allow Clmt to review documents
Allow ER to review documents
For additional testimony (insufficient time to finish)










Documents Received Prior to Hearing
How Sent to Other Party (Fax-F; Overnight Service-O;
Mail-M)
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